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English and Kuzel: Reliability of eyewitness reports to a major aviation accident

Dr. Percy Walker, director of Britain’s Ministry of Aviation accident
inspector branch in the early 1960’s, was said by The Sunday Times to have
researched more crashes than anybody else in the world (Air Correspondent,
1962). In the same article he was quoted as saying that eyewitnesses to aviation
accidents are “almost always wrong” (p. 8). Contemporary accident investigation
textbooks employ more measured language (Strauch, 2002; Wood & Sweginnis,
2006) but they do note that inconsistences are often found among eyewitness
accounts. In the 50 years since Dr. Walker’s statement, research into eyewitness
testimony has advanced considerably; however there remains a paucity of
published empirical studies regarding the validity and reliability of aviation crash
witness statements.
We have long known eyewitness testimony to be less than completely
reliable (Loftus 1996; Toglia, Reed, Ross & Lindsay, 2006). Over a century ago
Münsterberg (1908) gave many examples, including the time a revolver was fired
during a lecture. The dramatic scene was all play-acting, part of a controlled
experiment. Similar experimental techniques are still used in eyewitness research,
but have limitations (Memon, Mastroberardino & Fraser, 2008). Field and
archival techniques further expand our understanding (Wells, Memon & Penrod,
2006), and have included studies of witness records of large traumatic events such
as the Titanic sinking (Riniolo, Loledin, Drakulic & Payne, 2003), the Oklahoma
City Federal Building bombers (Memon & Wright, 1999) and the 9/11 attacks
(Altmann, 2003). But despite over 100 years of research, and more than 2,000
papers published on eyewitness identification in the past 30 years, studies on
aircraft accident eyewitness reports remain scarce. Dodge (1983) found variability
in witness accounts of a major aviation crash, but the sample size (n = 20) was
relatively small and all witnesses were on-board survivors of the crash they were
describing.
There are many variables known to influence eyewitness accuracy
(Brewer & Wells, 2011). Memory of an event can by changed by exposure to
misinformation about the event (Zaragoza & Lane, 1994), by reactivating the
memory (St. Jacques & Schacter, 2013), by trauma and perceived culpability
(Foster & Naylor, 1999), by social conformity (Edelson, Sharot, Dolan & Dudai,
2011), and by talking about the event (Wright, Memon, Skagerberg & Gabbert,
2009). However people evaluating the statements are often not aware of these
issues. A review of eyewitness reliability in motor vehicle crashes (Robins, 2009)
notes that juries show a “marked preference” for eyewitness evidence over what
should be the more compelling physical evidence. A survey of potential jurors in
the District of Columbia (Schmechel, O’Toole, Easterly & Loftus, 2006) finds
they “misunderstand how memory generally works and how particular factors …
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affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony” (p. 194). Even informed
psychologists may be misled. Chan, Thomas and Bulevich (2009) show “real-life
eyewitness memory may be even more susceptible to misinformation than is
currently envisioned” (p.66).
Following a summary of several aircraft accidents that seem to provide
some qualitative support to claims of mistaken eyewitness accounts, we subject
the extensive archival witness record of a major aviation accident to statistical
analysis. The aim of the study, to demonstrate the reliability of eyewitness reports
to a major aviation accident, is achieved with several statistical analyses
converging towards a conclusion of unreliability.
Qualitative Examples of Aviation Accident Eyewitness Validity and
Reliability
There are many aircraft accident reports where eyewitnesses are generally
in agreement with each other and the final accident probable cause; for example
the takeoff of a DC-9 seen by 100 external observers where “none of the
witnesses described smoke or flames coming from any part of the airplane other
than the right engine” (National Transportation Safety Board, 1987). Sometimes a
single eyewitness can supply otherwise ephemeral evidence, as for example the
farmhand who reported that something fell off an accident aircraft: “Whizzed past
me [h]ead it did, and when I dug it out of ground a large chuck of ice it were”
(Brown, 1962, p. 38). The probable cause of the crash was determined to be
inflight icing based largely on the farmhand’s account. However there are also
many well-recorded cases that support the late Dr. Walker’s contention, cases
where aviation accident eyewitnesses report seeing things that did not happen or
substantially confuse the order of events.
At an airshow in 1952, a supersonic fighter disintegrated in the air causing
the death of both crew and 29 spectators (Staff, 1952). Over 100,000 people
witnessed the accident. A public appeal was put out for witness accounts and
photographs to help solve the mystery, resulting in several thousand letters being
collected. Rivas and Bullen (2008) found “many of the accounts are touchingly
detailed and well intentioned, but the whole of the vast mail was of little use” (p.
186). The vital clue that led to determination of probable cause was supplied by a
cine film. The in-flight breakup happened in less than a second, and almost all the
eyewitnesses, including experienced pilots, gave grossly inaccurate accounts
when compared to the film record.
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Investigating the mid-air collision of a passenger DC-9 and a Marine
Corps F-4 the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found “witnesses in
the area of the accident gave widely varying accounts” (NTSB, 1972). Five
people described both aircraft on steady courses prior to the collision, but fifteen
people described the fighter aircraft in a rolling or evasive maneuver prior to the
collision.
Wilikinson (1977) quotes an eyewitness to a crash describing a light
aeroplane just before impact as “heading right toward the ground—straight down”
(p.102). However photographs of the crash site clearly showed the aeroplane
plane hit flat and at a low enough angle to skid for almost 1,000 feet. Two expert
eyewitnesses to a crash on takeoff of a MD-82 stated that the wing flaps were
extended, but the Board determined the flaps were in fact not extended (NTSB,
1988). What was initially reported as a possible bombing of a B767 due to many
eyewitness accounts of the plane first exploding in fire (Johnson, 1991; Kelly &
Elliott, 1991) turned out to be caused by the uncommanded activation of an
engine thrust reverser (Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee, 1993).
When a fuel tank explosion caused a B747 to descend in pieces from
13,000 feet, the fireball was seen by hundreds of people, about one-third of who
reported that they observed a streak of light moving upward in the sky (NTSB,
2000). However there was no evidence that a missile struck the plane, and
physical examination of the wreckage unequivocally supports the cause as a fuel
tank explosion. Thirty-eight of the witnesses described a streak of light as
ascending vertically. Forty-five reported that a streak moved to the east, 23 that it
moved to the west, 18 that it moved to the south, and 4 that it moved to the north.
When a MD-82 crashed on takeoff initial reports included eyewitness
accounts of an engine catching fire as the aeroplane heading down the runway
(Goodman, Todd & Koch 2008; Naughton & Strange, 2008). However analysis
showed that engine performance was normal on takeoff, and that the cause of the
crash was failure to set the flaps (CIAIAC, 2008).
A Cessna 310R that crashed following a steep descent was observed by
several witnesses. All described to the NTSB (2012) a nose-down, vertical
descent to ground contact. However some described the engine sound as “full
throttle,” “wide open,” “really loud,” and “never let up on [the] throttle” But
others stated the engine was “puttering” or “quit” before the descent (para. 3).
One witness believed he had seen a meteorite. A veteran aviation journalist wrote
of the eyewitness accounts, “as is often the case, they disagreed” (McClellan,
2013, p. 84).
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Considering these examples, it’s understandable that not just journalists
are unconvinced by accident eyewitness accounts. NTSB Member John Goglia
declared that eyewitness reports of aeroplane crashes are often mistaken
(Halbfinger & Wald, 2003), and NTSB spokesperson Ted Lopatkiewicz asserted
“eyewitness testimony at a plane crash … is unreliable” (Wald, 2002, p. 5). These
professional opinions are not however shared by the general public (Simons &
Chabris, 2011). Eyewitness reports are often given prominence in press reports
and used in legal actions. Philosophers have long grappled with the dual ideas of
human conviction and disagreement, with Renouvier declaring in 1859 that
“properly speaking, there is no certainty; there are only people who are certain”
(Schulz, 2010, p. 159). Decades of experience have led aviation crash
investigators to discount eyewitness accounts, and instead rely on flight recorders,
radar recordings and physical evidence to determine cause. There are, however,
no systematic published studies of aviation crash eyewitness accounts to validate
investigators beliefs. This is due in part to the problems of creating a controlled
experiment. It is much easier for a psychology lab to stage a fistfight or a robbery,
than it is to stage a burning airliner coming out of the sky.
Description of AA587 Crash
On the morning of November 12th, 2001, an American Airlines wide-body
A300 jet climbed into clear sunny skies over New York City on what was planned
to be a routine flight. A few minutes later flight 587 violently pitched down and
crashed into the middle of a residential neighborhood (Kleinfeld, 2001). All 260
people on board died, along with an additional five people on the ground. Coming
two months after the 9/11 attacks, there were initially fears that this may have
been another terrorist attack. A large NTSB and Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) effort was mounted to determine what happened, an investigation that
included interviewing hundreds of eyewitnesses.
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of flight 587’s accident was
co-pilot rudder inputs that resulted in the vertical stabilizer breaking off from the
fuselage and falling into Jamaica bay (NTSB, 2004). The loss of a primary
aerodynamic flight control surface and substantial change in center of mass
caused the jet to pitch down and dive towards the ground. Recovery was
impossible. Fifteen seconds after rudder separation the plane crashed into the
quiet Belle Harbor suburb of Queens, New York, a three-kilometer (1.8 mile) by
one kilometer (0.6 mile) (at its widest) neighborhood located on a barrier
peninsula between Jamaica Bay and the Atlantic Ocean (figure 1). The majority
of the aircraft made landfall close to the geographic center of the community,
destroying three homes and damaging six others in a post-impact fire. Both
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engines separated from the wings before impact, landing about 200 metres from
the main wreckage. The accident was not survivable for the airplane occupants.

Figure 1. Photograph of Belle Harbor. Taken from an altitude of 2000 feet over
the Atlantic Ocean, looking northwest with Jamaica Bay and New York City in
the background; it was into the center of this neighborhood that American
Airlines 587 crashed. (Photo by author D. English.)

The weather that morning was clear and brisk. Immediately before the
accident JFK airport reported the wind to be from 310º at 11 knots, visibility
unrestricted, a few clouds at 4,300 feet with a temperature of 6º C. The sun was
positioned 22.5º above the horizon, bearing 142º true (NTSB, 2004). The Times
called it a brilliant, blue sky (Kleinfield 2001). Belle Harbor residents are under a
busy flight path for JFK departures, so they are used to seeing airliners pass
overhead. Flight 587 was determined by the NTSB to have been viewed by a total
of 354 witnesses that provided sufficient detail to document. More pertinently, the
majority of witnesses were concentrated in Belle Harbor. It is extremely rare to
have such a numerous, compact group unexpectedly observe a nearby lowaltitude airliner crash in good weather from all angles. The fact that these
eyewitnesses must have had an emotional reaction to the disaster, and no doubt
later watched TV news reports, and/or read newspaper accounts of the accident,
and discussed their observations with others, before making their statements
might seem to diminish their use in eyewitness research. It is known that human
memory is strikingly susceptible to social (Wright, Memon, Skagerberg &
Gabbert, 2009) and other sullying influences (Foster & Naylor 1999; Robins,
2009). But since we are concerned with real world accident investigations this
seeming contamination is the more expected condition, the reality of actual
witness statements, and maybe gives archival methodology more validity than
experimental techniques (Christianson, 1992).
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Materials and Methods
Recording witness statements was earnest work due to the number of
fatalities and the immediate lack of a clear cause. Interviews were undertaken by a
large number of NTSB, local police and FBI agents. Using the NTSB Witness
Group Factual Report (Schiada, 2002) as a model, we created an Excel
spreadsheet containing all 354 witness summaries. While there are considerable
original records of the interviews, it was not recorded how the questions were
posed, or what other reports (media/social) may have influenced the witness. Our
dataset used only the original consensus NTSB Witness Group interpretation of
each witness’s testimony.
Our goal in constructing a dataset to analyze was to have the highest
likelihood of finding reliability. By removing obvious outliers and controlling for
geographic position we stood the best chance of discovering patterns. And if no
patterns are found in this clean dataset, we strengthen the hypothesis that data
from eyewitness reports are unreliable. We removed witnesses that were moving
on boats, trains, planes or whose position was otherwise uncertain. We also
removed witnesses who were many kilometers from the crash site, resulting in a
dataset containing 239 Belle Harbor witnesses (defined as all ground witness
between 149th Street and 108th Street). Coding the witness location into the
dataset would allow us to control for position relative to the crash. We determined
the geographic coordinates of the Belle Harbor witnesses using the information
reported in the NTSB Appendixes A and B (street address or textual description
of location) in combination with an examination of Google Earth and Google
Street View. The resulting Keyhole Markup Language (KML) file is rendered as
figure 2 using the USGS National Map Viewer. Location was initially coded into
the spreadsheet using a city-block grid centered on the crash site at 131st Street
and Newport Avenue. We then performed a matrix rotation, giving us witness
location using Cartesian coordinates with origin at main crash site, abscissa as
position left or right of aircraft track, and ordinate as position along aircraft track.
We also converted the Cartesian coordinates into polar coordinates for analysis
based on distance from the crash site. The data were now in a useful format to
allow us to perform a series of statistical measures on the witness statements.
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Figure 2.. Belle Harbor Eyewitness Locations. The gray line ending in a red
marker shows the path of the main body of the aircraft. Each green marker is an
eyewitness, the other red markers show final location of the engines and left wing
tip.

Analysis 1: Fire
Of the 239 Bellee Harbor witnesses
itnesses 183 expressed an opinion about the
airliner being on fire or not before it impacted the ground. The NTSB stated that
the no-fire
fire code was only “utilized in situations when a witness specifically
indicated he or she did not see any fire
fire” (Schiada, 2002, p. 4).. This leaves 56
(23%) that expressed no opinion on this question. Our analysis used only those
witnesses that expressed
essed a definite opinion, in a continuing attempt to collect the
cleanest, most reliable, witness pool.
Belle Harbor witnesses were not in agreement about the airliner being on
fire or not before it impacted the ground. The distribution of the 183 witnesses
that reported either observing no fire (65) or some fire (118) was investigated
using RStudio 0.97.311 (R Core Team
Team, 2012) and MATLAB 2011a (MATLAB
MATLAB,
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2011) software with all tests of significance at a p = .05 criterion. The majority
opinion of all eyewitnesses expressing an opinion on pre-impact fire is
statistically significant (using chi-square test with an equally divided fire/no-fire
null hypothesis (χ² [1, N = 183] = 15.35, p < .001). Graphical mapping shows
little discernable geographic pattern (figure 3). Separate logistic regression
analyses with fire/no-fire as the binary categorical dependent variable and a
geographic dimension (in km) as the independent (predictor) variable reveals no
significant relationship along the abscissa (b = 0.39 p = .109), the ordinate (b =
0.14 p = .788), or distance from the crash site (b = -0.22 p = .567). This confirms
the intuitive conclusion from the graphical mapping that there is no preferred
orientation for these eyewitness reports. Indeed, the overall distribution of the fire
witnesses compared to no-fire witnesses appears by eye to be about the same.
This more general assertion is harder to test, as the witness pool was drawn from a
decidedly non-uniformly distributed population (on a peninsula, tending to be on
busy streets or popular locations).

Figure 3. Was there pre-impact fire? Witnesses that reported seeing pre-impact
fire are in red, those that saw no fire in blue. The gray line is the flight path. Some
locations jittered to prevent overplotting.
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We investigated independence with a two-tailed two-dimensional paired
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Peacock’s algorithm (Peacock, 1983) determines
whether two sets of data arise from the same or different distributions without
making any assumptions of the distribution. While the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
has sometimes been considered a weak form of analysis, it has the required
advantage here that it is non-parametric and distribution free. Use of Peacock’s
test for multi-dimensional data sets is well established (Lopes, Reid & Hobson,
2007). The null hypothesis is that both data sets are drawn from the same
continuous distribution. For the fire/no fire distributions, the null hypothesis is not
rejected (D = 0.167, p = 0.200), suggesting that indeed the fire and no-fire
distributions are the same.
Assuming the distribution of fire/no-fire witnesses to be uniform, we can
calculate the results of polling smaller samples of witnesses from the group
without regard to location. While the majority opinion is statistically significant,
the variance is considerable. This becomes increasingly important when
considering the small number of witnesses that view most aviation accidents.
Applying hypergeometric distribution analysis to the dataset values, a poll of 5
witnesses reveals a 24% probability that a majority of such a sample would have
reported seeing no pre-impact fire (the opposite of the majority opinion in the
population). With 10 witnesses there is still a 9% probability that a majority
would report no fire, and a 92% probability that 2 of the 10 would report against
the population majority opinion. Clearly the variance found in this compact
eyewitness population means that eyewitness consensus in commonly sized
witness samples is unlikely and that a majority of such a sample may disagree
with the population majority opinion.
As to location of the fire, Belle Harbor observers that saw fire offered
varying details: 7% said there was a fire in the right engine, 7% in the right wing,
6% in the tail, 41% in the fuselage, 9% in the left engine, 17% in the left wing,
14% in a miscellaneous area, 4% in an undefined wing, and 4% in an undefined
engine. The NTSB determined “witnesses who reported observing the airplane on
fire were most likely observing a fire from the initial release of fuel or the effects
of engine compressor surges” (NTSB, 2004). The engines themselves suffered no
in-flight fire, and there was probably no other pre-impact fire.
Analysis 2: Smoke
Belle Harbor witnesses were not in agreement about the airliner leaving a
smoke trail or not before it impacted the ground. The distribution of the 105
witnesses that reported either no smoke (60) or some smoke (45) was investigated

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2014

9

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 1 [2014], Iss. 4, Art. 9

using the same tools and methods. Again, graphical mapping shows no
discernable geographic pattern (figure 4). The majority opinion of no smoke is not
statistically significant using a chi-square test with a no preference null hypothesis
(χ² [1, N = 105] = 2.14, p = .143). Logistic regression analyses show no
significant relationship to the smoke/no smoke reports along the abscissa (b =
0.30 p = .296) or the ordinate (b = -0.14 p = .818). There is an observed trend for
an increased probability to report smoke with increasing distance from the crash
site, but this was not statistically significant (b = 0.93 p = .066). A two-tailed twodimensional paired Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the null hypothesis
that the two data sets are drawn from the same continuous distribution (D = 0.239,
p = 0.200).

Figure 4. Was there pre-impact smoke? Witnesses that reported seeing pre-impact
smoke in red, those that reported no smoke in blue. The gray line is the flight
path.
Hypergeometric distribution analysis reveals that if five random witnesses
were polled from the group, there is a 36% probability that a majority of them
would have reported pre-impact smoke, the opposite of the no smoke majority
with this population. With 10 witnesses there is still a 21% probability that a
majority would report smoke, and a 97% probability that 2 of the 10 would report
against the population majority opinion.
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As to location of the pre-impact smoke, Belle Harbor observers that saw
smoke offered varying details: 2% reported the right engine, 13% the right wing,
7% the tail, 29% the fuselage, 9% the left engine, 7% the left wing, 42% from a
miscellaneous area, 4% an undefined wing, and 2% an undefined engine. The
NTSB report reached no conclusion about how much or from where the jetliner
was emitting smoke prior to impact.
Analysis 3: Noise
The distribution of the 239 witnesses that reported either in-flight noise (156) or
no noise (83) was investigated using the same tools and methods. Graphical
mapping shows no discernable geographic pattern (figure 5). Logistic regression
analyses show no significant relationship to the noise/no noise reports along the
abscissa (b = -0.02 p = .287) or the ordinate (b = 0.01 p = .831). There is an
observed trend for a decreased probability to report noise with increasing distance
from the crash site; with about 70% of witnesses immediately adjacent to the
crash site reporting hearing noise, decreasing to about 50% reporting noise when
two kilometers (1.2 miles) away. However this was not statistically significant (b
= -0.04 p = .105). A two-tailed two-dimensional paired Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
does not reject the null hypothesis that the two data sets are drawn from the same
continuous distribution (D = 0.210 p = 0.200).
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Figure 5. Was there pre-impact noise? Witnesses that reported hearing pre-impact
noise in red, those that reported no noise in blue. The gray line is the flight path.
The majority opinion of in-flight noise is statistically significant using a
chi-square test with a no preference null hypothesis, (χ² (1, N = 239) = 22.30, p <
.001). Hypergeometric distribution analysis reveals that if five witnesses were
randomly polled, there is a 23% probability that a majority of them would have
reported no in-flight noise, the opposite of the in-flight noise majority with this
population. With 10 witnesses there is still a 9% probability that a majority would
report no noise, and a 92% probability that 2 of the 10 would report against the
population majority opinion.
Analysis 4: Explosion
Forty-one (17%) of the Belle Harbor witness pool reported that in addition
to noise, they heard a pre-impact explosion (or boom or loud pop). Geographical
mapping shows no discernible pattern (figure 6), confirmed by logistic regression
analyses that show no statistically significant relationship to the explosion/nonoise reports along the abscissa (b = -.03 p = .282), the ordinate (b = -0.68 p =
.228) or distance from the crash site (b = 0.30 p = .486). A two-tailed twodimensional paired Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the null hypothesis
that the two data sets are drawn from the same continuous distribution (D = 0.182
p = 0.200).
The majority opinion of no explosion is statistically significant using a
chi-square test with a no preference null hypothesis (χ² [1, N = 239] = 175.84, p <
.001). Hypergeometric distribution analysis reveals that if five witnesses were
polled from the group, there is a 4% probability that a majority of them would
have reported a pre-impact explosion, the opposite of majority opinion with this
population. This is a much lower probability that the other categories studied, but
even in this case the probability of all five witnesses agreeing there was no
explosion is only 61%. With 10 witnesses there is a 1.5% probability that a
majority would report an explosion, and a 54% probability that 2 of the 10 would
report against the population majority opinion.
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Figure 6. Was there a pre-impact explosion? Witnesses that reported a pre-impact
explosion in red, those that reported no explosion in blue. The gray line is the
flight path.

Limitations
This study is subject to all the limitations inherent in archival eyewitness
research. This includes, but is not limited to, a limited sample size, a nonrandom
sample, participant self-selection, no control for retention interval, eyewitnesses
with varied vantage points, conflation of geographic position with other factors,
multicollinearity, lack of control of eyewitness interviews, no control for
emotional state, no control for post-observation social or media influence,
possible limited generalizability of one specific type of accident to other aviation
accidents, and an inability to manipulate variables. Interviews were conducted by
three different organizations (local police/FBI/NTSB) at varying times using
varying formats (written submissions/telephone/face-to-face) with no records of
witness media or social exposure. The NTSB found disagreements between
statements given to different investigators at different times (Schiada, 2002). And
they noted that, “disagreement and direct conflicts also existed between

statements from the same source (e.g. two or more police statements
pertaining to the same witness)” (p.7).
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Despite the methodological limitations, many authors have supported
archival research as a naturalistic contribution to the use of multiple
investigational techniques to uncover reality (Christianson, 1992; Christianson,
Goodman & Loftus, 1992).
Discussion
Eyewitness reports to this airplane crash show considerable disparities.
Even with over two hundred witnesses in a compact geographic area stating an
observation, the variance was large enough to preclude forming a statistically
significant conclusion about a basic large-scale event (was the aircraft trailing
smoke). And while in three other cases a statistically significant conclusion could
be reached from the large ‘clean’ dataset, the observed variances were still
considerable. These quantitative results are in agreement with the apparent
variability of eyewitness statements qualitatively reported for other widely
observed aviation accidents.
Furthermore, analysis of the geographic distribution of the witness group
observations shows no significant pattern. Logistic regression showed no
statistically significant structure for four types of observation along three possible
dimensions of regularity. Two-tailed two-dimensional paired KolmogorovSmirnov tests showed that eyewitnesses reporting opposite observations were
drawn from the same continuous distribution. We might expect some directions
relative to the flight path of the aircraft to give a clearer view of an airborne event,
or people closer to an event to be better (or worse) witnesses, but our findings
show that in this case location of a witness does not appear to significantly affect
the validity of major observations reported. The variance was evenly spread by
geographic location within the witness pool.
If the accident were to have been observed by only a small group of
witnesses (as is common), there is considerable probability that the witnesses
would not agree; and there is the possibility that a majority of the witnesses would
report against the population majority. That small groups have a remarkably high
chance of not following the population characteristics has been proven since
Pascal’s Triangle in the 1600’s (Mlodinow, 2008); and the mistaken intuition that
a small sample will accurately reflect underlying probabilities was called the law
of small numbers by Kahneman and Tversky (1971). Thus, the findings for
commonly sized small samples are not surprising. However, the inability to make
a statistically significant conclusion about a basic large-scale event from the large
(N > 200) sample is unexpected.
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Combining the high variances, the lack of any preferred observational
perspective and the law of small numbers, a conclusion of eyewitness unreliability
for aviation crashes is unavoidable. Although they sound compelling — “I saw
the crash with my own eyes” — a small group of witnesses to an aviation accident
giving reports several days after the event may well not produce reliable
information. This is demonstrated to be true for a crash as seemingly perceptible
as a wide-body transport jet at low altitude in clear daylight conditions. Dr. Percy
Walker’s claim that eyewitnesses to aviation accidents are almost always wrong is
certainly not proven. But the current reported practice by accident investigators of
placing low value to eyewitness accounts of aircraft crashes is supported by the
empirical evidence.
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